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Theme: Radicalisation into violence affects some small segments of the American Muslim 
population and recent events show that a threat from homegrown terrorism of jihadist 
inspiration does exist in the US. 
 
 
Summary: The wave of arrests and thwarted plots recently seen in the US has severely 
undermined the long-held assumption that American Muslims, unlike their European 
counterparts, are virtually immune to radicalisation. In reality, as argued in this ARI, 
evidence also existed before the autumn of 2009, highlighting how radicalisation affected 
some small segments of the American Muslim population exactly like it affects some 
fringe pockets of the Muslim population of each European country. After putting forth this 
argument, this paper analyses the five concurring reasons traditionally used to explain the 
divergence between the levels of radicalisation in Europe and the US: better economic 
conditions, lack of urban ghettoes, lower presence of recruiting networks, different 
demographics and a more inclusive sense of citizenship. While all these characteristics 
still hold true, they no longer represent a guarantee, as other factors such as perception of 
discrimination and frustration at US foreign policies could lead to radicalisation. Finally, 
the paper looks at the post-9/11 evolution of the homegrown terrorist threat to the US 
homeland and examines possible future scenarios.1
 
 
 
Analysis: The American authorities and public have been shocked by the tragic events of 
5 November 2009, when Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan allegedly opened fire against 
fellow soldiers inside the Fort Hood military base, killing 13 people and wounding 30 
others. The shooting triggered a heated debate over Major Hasan’s motives. Earlier 
analyses focused on personal and psychological factors, such as his alleged distress 
towards his forthcoming deployment to Iraq and the abuses he had reportedly suffered 
from other soldiers. As the days went by, more and more evidence surfaced pointing to 
Major Hasan’s radical Islamist sympathies. Colleagues and acquaintances described 
                                                 
* Fellow at the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and a Peace Scholar at 
the US Institute of Peace. 
1 It goes without saying that various forms of homegrown terrorism have long threatened the US, some of 
them well before those of jihadist inspiration. Right-wing militias, radical environmentalist groups and, to a 
lesser degree, some fringe left-wing and anarchist groups are very much active inside the country and have 
occasionally carried out violent acts over the last few years. Yet it is undeniable that, in terms of magnitude, 
frequency and sophistication, homegrown terrorism of jihadist inspiration currently represents the most 
immediate threat against the US and is therefore the subject of this analysis. 
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many instances in which the Virginia-born Army psychiatrist had expressed extremely 
negative feelings towards the US and praised acts of violence against it. Reports also 
indicated that the FBI had investigated Major Hasan’s e-mail conversations with Anwar al 
Awlaqi, a US-born Yemeni-based cleric known for his fiery rhetoric and links to two of the 
9/11 hijackers. 
 
Authorities have so far been reluctant to officially label the Fort Hood shooting an act of 
terrorism and, at the time of writing, various investigations are exploring all angles of this 
tragic event. While it might be premature, if ever possible, to identify the full spectrum of 
motives behind Major Hasan’s actions, it is fair to say that radical Islamist ideology had an 
influence on his worldview. In any case, the Fort Hood shooting comes at the tail end of 
two months that have challenged many of the assumptions on terrorism and radicalisation 
in the US that have shaped the debate for more than a decade. Since September 2009, in 
fact, a staggering series of arrests has taken place on US soil: 
 
• On 20 September, FBI agents arrested two Afghan immigrants in Colorado and one in 
New York.2 According to the authorities, one of the men, Najibullah Zazi, had trained 
in an al-Qaeda training camp in Pakistan and, once back in the US, had purchased 
large quantities of chemical substances in various beauty supply stores. Zazi allegedly 
intended to mix the substances and detonate them against targets throughout the 
New York metropolitan area. The authorities described Zazi’s plot as the most serious 
threat against the US homeland uncovered since 9/11.3 
• On 24 September, a 19-year-old Jordanian immigrant was arrested for having parked 
what he believed to be a car bomb in the car park of a 60-story skyscraper in 
downtown Dallas, Texas.4 Before driving the car to the site, Hosam Hamer Husein 
Smadi had made a video which he believed would have been sent to Osama bin 
Laden.5 
• On the same day but in an unrelated plot, Michael C. Finton, a 29-year-old American-
born convert to Islam, parked a car that he also believed laden with explosives outside 
a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois.6 In both the Finton and the Smadi cases, 
federal agents had approached the two men after unearthing information about their 
desire to commit acts of violence, led them to believe they were affiliated to al-Qaeda 
and supplied them with explosives that the men wrongly believed to be active. 
• On 21 October, the authorities indicted two Boston-area natives, Tarek Mehanna and 
Ahmad Abousamra, with various conspiracy charges.7 According to the indictment, the 
men, who had been extremely active in online jihadist forums, had been trying to join 
various al-Qaeda affiliates since 2001 and had also planned attacks inside the US 
(reportedly targeting a local shopping mall and various US government officials). 
• On 27 October, the authorities arrested two long-time Chicago residents of Pakistani 
descent and charged them with conspiracy to provide material support and/or to 
commit terrorist acts against overseas targets.8 According to the charges the two men 
had been in close contact with senior leaders of Pakistani jihadist groups Lashkar e 
                                                 
2 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel09/zazi_092009.htm. 
3 Kevin Johnson, ‘Alleged terror threat seen as “most serious” since 9/11 attacks’, USA Today, 
25/IX/2009. 
4 http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl092409.htm. 
5 Jon Nielsen, ‘FBI says Dallas terror plot suspect made video to send to Osama bin Laden’, Dallas Morning 
News, 5/X/ 2009. 
6 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ilc/press/2009/09September/24Finton.html. 
7 http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/bs102109a.htm. 
8 http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/pr1027_01.pdf. 
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Taiba and Harakat ul Jihad Islami and one of them, Daood Gilani, had travelled to 
Denmark to conduct surveillance of the facilities of the Danish newspaper Jyllands 
Posten for a possible attack against it. On 7 December the authorities charged Gilani 
also with conducting surveillance of various targets in Mumbai in the two years 
preceding the deadly November 2008 attack on the Indian city. According to the 
indictment, upon accepting the task Gilani changed his name to David Headley and 
travelled at least five times to Mumbai, confident that his new name and American 
passport would not attract the attention of the Indian authorities. After each trip he 
travelled to Pakistan, where he shared the pictures, videotapes and notes he had 
taken with senior Lashkar e Taiba operatives.9 
• On 28 October, the federal authorities in Detroit proceeded to arrest 11 members of 
Ummah, a group of mostly African-American converts to Islam, on charges that 
ranged from mail fraud to illegal possession and sale of firearms. Most suspects were 
arrested without opposing resistance, but Luqman Ameen Abdullah (alias Christopher 
Thomas), the group’s leader, fired at agents and was subsequently killed. While the 
case cannot be considered a full-fledged terrorism investigation, it nevertheless 
involves a US-based radical Islamist network. Ummah, in fact, is a group that, 
according to authorities, ‘seeks to establish a separate Sharia-law governed state 
within the United States’ and whose members have been involved in violent acts in 
the past.10 
• Finally, in early December, the Pakistani authorities arrested five American Muslims in 
the city of Sargodha. The five, all US citizens in their late teens and early 20s who had 
gone missing from their northern Virginia homes a few days earlier, had reportedly 
been in touch via the Internet with senior militants of various al-Qaeda-affiliated 
organisations and allegedly intended to train with local outfits to fight against US 
forces.11 
 
All these plots are very diverse in their origin, degree of sophistication and characteristics 
of the individuals involved. Yet they all contribute to paint the picture of the complex and 
rapidly changing reality of terrorism of Islamist inspiration in the US. Moreover, they 
smash or, at least, severely undermine an assumption that has been widely held by 
policymakers and analysts over the last 15 years. The common wisdom, in fact, has 
traditionally been that American Muslims, unlike their European counterparts, were 
virtually immune to radicalisation. Europeans, argued this narrative, have been unable to 
integrate their immigrant Muslim population and radicalisation is the inevitable by-product 
of the discrimination and socio-economic disparity suffered by European Muslims. 
America, on the other hand, is more open to its immigrants and has been able to integrate 
its Muslims, making them impervious to radicalisation. 
 
The wave of arrests of the last months of 2009 has contributed to shedding light on a 
reality that is significantly more nuanced, showing that radicalisation affects some small 
segments of the American Muslim population exactly like it affects some fringe pockets of 
the Muslim population of each European country. Evidence supporting this view has been 
available for a long time, as the cases of American Muslims joining radical Islamist groups 
date back to the 1970s.12 According to data collected by the NYU Center on Law and 
                                                 
9 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-nsd-1304.html. 
10 http://detroit.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/de102809.htm. 
11 Waqar Gilani & Jane Perlez, ‘5 US Men Arrested Said to Plan Jihad Training’, New York Times, 
11/XII/2009. 
12 For an overview, see Lorenzo Vidino, ‘Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and 
Occasional Phenomenon?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, 1/I/2009, p. 1-17. 
 3
Area: International Terrorism 
ARI 171/2009 
Date: 18/12/2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Security, for example, more than 500 individuals have been convicted by the American 
authorities for terrorism-related charges since 9/11.13 Most of them are US citizens or 
long-time US residents who underwent radicalisation inside the US. While making a 
numerically accurate comparison is not easy, it is fair to say that the number of American 
Muslims involved in violent activities is either equal or only slightly lower than that of any 
European country with a comparable Muslim population. 
 
Yet, despite this evidence, for a long time the American authorities and commentators 
seemed unable to acknowledge the existence of radicalisation among small segments of 
the American Muslim population. In the FBI’s parlance, for example, until 2005, the term 
‘homegrown terrorism’ was still reserved for domestic organisations such as anti-
government militias, white supremacists and eco-terrorist groups such as the Earth 
Liberation Front. Such groups were termed ‘homegrown’ to distinguish them from jihadist 
terrorist networks, even though some of the latter possessed some of the very same 
characteristics (membership born and raised in the US and a focus on US targets). Since 
the cause of the jihadists was perceived to be foreign, the US government did not label 
them as ‘homegrown’, despite the typically homegrown characteristics of many of them. 
 
The July 2005 attacks in London led the US authorities to look at the homegrown issue 
with renewed attention. As an increasing number of cells that clearly possessed 
homegrown characteristics were uncovered throughout the country, the authorities began 
to re-assess the definition of homegrown. By 2006 top FBI and DHS officials began to 
openly speak of homegrown terrorism of jihadist inspiration inside the US, even describing 
it as a threat ‘as dangerous as groups like al-Qaeda, if not more so’.14 As a consequence 
of this reassessment, the US authorities began to ask themselves if the emergence of 
relatively large numbers of radicalised second-generation Muslims that had been 
observed in Europe could also take place in the US. This fear led to an increased 
attention on the dynamics and causes of radicalisation among Muslims in both Europe 
and North America. 
 
Comparing Radicalisation in Europe and America 
Five concurring reasons have traditionally been used to explain the divergence between 
the levels of radicalisation in Europe and the US. The first one is related to the 
significantly better economic conditions of American Muslims. While European Muslims 
generally languish at the bottom of most rankings that measure economic integration, 
American Muslims fare significantly better, and the average American Muslim household’s 
income is equal to, if not higher, than the average American’s.15 As the many cases of 
militants who came from privileged backgrounds have proved, economic integration is not 
always an antidote to radicalisation, but it is undeniable that radical ideas find a fertile 
environment among unemployed and disenfranchised youth. A direct consequence of 
economic integration is the lack of Muslim ghettoes in the US. Areas of large European 
cities with a high concentration of poor Muslim immigrants have been ideological 
sanctuaries where radicals could freely spread their message and where radical Islam has 
become a sort of counterculture. The American Muslim community’s economic conditions 
have prevented the formation of such enclaves in the US. 
 
 
                                                 
13 http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRCHighlightsSept25th.pdf. 
14 Remarks of FBI Director Robert Muller, City Club of Cleveland, 23/VI/2006. 
15 Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, Pew Research Center, 22/V/2007, p. 24-5. 
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Geographic dispersion, immigration patterns and tougher immigration policies have also 
prevented the formation of extensive recruiting and propaganda networks as those that 
have sprung up in Europe. While places such as Brooklyn’s al-Farooq mosque or 
Tucson’s Islamic Center saw extensive jihadist activities in the 1990s, they pale in 
comparison to recruiting headquarters such as London’s Finsbury Park, Hamburg’s al-
Quds mosque or Milan’s Islamic Cultural Institute. Moreover, the fact that large segments 
of the American Muslim population belong to ethnicities that have traditionally espoused 
moderate interpretations of Islam has been cited as another reason for America’s lower 
levels of radicalism. In fact, Muslims from the Iranian and Indian American communities, 
which account for vast segments of America’s Muslim population, have traditionally 
embraced moderate forms of Islam and have been, to varying degrees, almost impervious 
to radicalisation. 
 
Finally, commentators have often pointed out that America is a country built on 
immigration, traditionally accepting immigrants of all races and religions as citizens. 
European countries, on the other hand, have been unable to develop a sense of 
citizenship not linked to century-long identifying factors such as ethnicity and religious 
affiliation. In a nutshell, it is easy to become American, while it is very difficult for 
immigrants, particularly if they are not white and Christian, to be accepted as full-fledged 
Germans, Frenchmen or Spaniards. This sense of exclusion is traditionally cited as one of 
the factors driving some European Muslims to radicalisation, while the more inclusive 
nature of American society would prevent American Muslims from undergoing the same 
process. 
 
While all these characteristics still hold true, they no longer represent a guarantee. 
Factors such as perception of discrimination and frustration at US foreign policies could 
lead to radicalisation, irrespective of favourable economic conditions. Experts and 
community leaders have repeatedly warned about the growing alienation of American 
Muslims, particularly among those of the second generation. These frustrations could 
produce what Steven Simon refers to as ‘a rejectionist generation’, which could embrace 
radical interpretations of Islam.16 The same conclusion has been reached by a widely 
publicised report released by the New York Police Department Intelligence Division in 
2007. ‘Despite the economic opportunities in the United States’, reads the report, ‘the 
powerful gravitational pull of individuals’ religious roots and identity sometimes 
supersedes the assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a 
professional career, financial stability and material comforts’.17
 
Various cases have shown that radicalisation can also touch communities where 
extremism is rare, such as Albanian and Iranian Americans. Moreover, the fact that no 
organised jihadist group has an extensive network in the country is no longer a guarantee 
that radicalisation cannot reach America’s shores, as the Internet has, in many cases, 
replaced the need to have operatives physically spreading the propaganda on the 
ground.18 Young American jihadist wannabes, given the easy access to the internet that 
they enjoy, have been extremely active online. A search of jihadist chat rooms and even 
of subgroups in ‘benign’ social network sites such as Myspace.com reveals the presence 
                                                 
16 Steven Simon, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
12/IX/2006.
17 Report by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, New York Police Department Intelligence Division, 
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, August 2007, p. 8. 
18 Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists’, Testimony before the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 4/V/2006. 
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of many American-born youngsters that glorify al-Qaeda’s ideology. By the same token, 
several cases have shown that the Internet has also become a way to connect American 
aspiring jihadists to like-minded individuals worldwide. 
 
Future Scenarios 
The terrorist threat to the US homeland has evolved significantly over the last eight years. 
Until mid-2003 virtually all of the terrorist conspiracies intended to strike against American 
soil had been planned, albeit with varying degrees of involvement, by Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (KSM) and al-Qaeda’s central leadership. The arrest of KSM and many of his 
top lieutenants, al-Qaeda’s loss of the Afghan sanctuary and the significant improvement 
in homeland security measures triggered a shift that began to materialise in late 2003. 
With the exception of the 2006 Transatlantic Plot, a plot hatched by UK-based militants 
apparently directed by al-Qaeda members in Pakistan to detonate liquid explosives on 
board several US-bound flights, every single attack against the American homeland 
thwarted by US authorities since then appears to have been conceived by individuals 
acting independently from al-Qaeda’s leadership.19
 
The individuals involved in these plots have been an odd mix of low-ranking al-Qaeda 
affiliates and jihad enthusiasts who had never had any contact with al-Qaeda or other 
established organisations. And most of them have been characterised by the absolute 
operational independence of the planners. The result of this shift from leader-led to 
homegrown has been a remarkable decrease in the sophistication of the operations 
planned, as most of the plotters were amateurish if not embarrassingly clumsy, lacking the 
basic tradecraft and capabilities to operate undetected or mount any sort of sophisticated 
attack. 
 
While this was true until a few months ago, there are indications that things are changing. 
Recent investigations have shown that a small yet increasing number of American 
Muslims have been travelling to Pakistan to acquire operational skills and establish 
contacts with various jihadist outfits. One well known case is that of Bryant Neal Vinas, a 
26 year-old Long Island native who was captured in Pakistan and brought back to the US 
in November 2008.20 Vinas, who had allegedly participated in a rocket attack against a US 
military base in Afghanistan, decided to cooperate with American interrogators and has 
since provided ‘an intelligence gold mine’.21 Thanks to Vinas’ information the authorities 
have been able to identify and arrest several American and European militants who had 
also trained with al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. 
 
While this ‘Pakistan connection’ is not new to the European authorities, it is a disturbing 
new development for their American counterparts. To be sure, Americans had trained with 
various Afghanistan/Pakistan-based jihadist outfits before and after 9/11. In 2003, for 
example, the US authorities dismantled the so-called ‘paintball jihad’ network in northern 
Virginia.22 The network was formed by a dozen young men from the Washington suburbs 
who had travelled to Pakistan immediately after 9/11, where they trained with Lashkar-e-
Taiba. But what seemed to be isolated cases are increasingly becoming the norm. 
Moreover, in the case of Vinas and at least two of the cases from the fall of 2009 (the 
                                                 
19 Vidino, ‘Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States’. 
20 US v. Bryant Neal Vinas, Superseding Indictment, US District Court, Eastern District of New York, 08-823 
(NGG) (S-1), 28/I/2009. 
21 ‘Man Was “Gold Mine” of Terror Intel’, Associated Press, 31/VII/2009. 
22 Terrorism in the United States, 2002-2005, unclassified report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.htm. 
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Najibullah Zazi/New York plot and the Chicago/Denmark plot) authorities have noticed 
with apprehension that American militants returning from Pakistan were significantly better 
trained and organised than the homegrown jihadists who had been operating in the US 
over the last few years. The ‘Pakistan connection’, that operational link to organised 
outfits in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area that makes amateurish homegrown networks 
graduate into more professional terrorist clusters, has been crucial in the development of 
jihadist networks in Europe over the last five years and it now appears to have become a 
significant factor also in the US. 
 
Given these dynamics, one of the scenarios that the US authorities take into particular 
consideration is the case of a homegrown cluster that, thanks to the directions and skills 
obtained from al-Qaeda or various al-Qaeda-affiliated networks in Afghanistan/Pakistan, 
manages to reach sufficient operational sophistication to carry out a significant attack 
against the American homeland.23 And if traditionally authorities estimated that al-Qaeda’s 
leadership intended to strike inside the US only with a mass-casualty attack that would at 
least rival the actions of 9/11, lately this assessment has been revised.24 Recent cases 
have shown that not only independent clusters but also American networks operating in 
cooperation with Afghanistan/Pakistan-based groups are focusing on less grandiose 
plans, considering that even a less ambitious attack –on the scale of the 2004 Madrid or 
2005 London bombings– would be a success. 
 
If Afghanistan/Pakistan is a major source of concerns, the authorities have also been 
monitoring the possible impact of the Somali conflict on American domestic security. Over 
the last few years, in fact, a few dozen young American Muslims have travelled to 
Somalia to fight and train alongside al-Shabaab, the local Islamist militia battling the 
Somali government and African Union troops. Most of them have been ethnic Somalis, 
sons of the large Somali diaspora community present in Minneapolis, Seattle and other 
American cities. One of them, 27-year-old Minneapolis college student Shirwa Ahmed, 
reportedly blew himself up in a suicide bombing in northern Somalia in October 2008.25 
Another four Minneapolis residents have been reported killed in the African country since 
then. A few non-ethnic Somali Americans have also reportedly joined al-Shabaab. While 
the New Jersey native of Egyptian descent Amir Mohamed Meshal and Massachusetts-
born convert Daniel Maldonado have been arrested after leaving Somalia, Alabama native 
Omar Hammami is still very much active inside the country, starring in several English 
language al-Shabaab propaganda videos under the nom de guerre Abu Mansour al 
Amriki. 
 
While there are no indications that al-Shabaab is planning an attack within the US, its 
increased focus on global issues and public support for al-Qaeda make the hypothesis not 
that far-fetched. Moreover, while many of the foreign fighters joining al-Shabaab, whether 
from the US, Europe or other regions, are Somalis driven by some sort of nationalist 
sentiment, others are aspiring jihadists whose interest in the African country is mostly 
tactical and temporary. It is safe to assume that many of them, given the opportunity, 
would use the skills acquired in Somalia against other targets. Questioned by American 
interrogators after his arrest, in fact, Daniel Maldonado described his experience in the 
African country with these words: ‘I would be fighting the Somali militia, and that turned 
                                                 
23 Interview with various FBI officials, September/October 2009, Boston and Washington DC. 
24 David Johnston & Eric Schmitt, ‘Smaller-Scale Terrorism Plots Pose New and Worrisome Threats, Officials 
Say’, New York Times, 31/X/2009. 
25 http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm. 
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into fighting the Ethiopians, and if Americans came, I would fight them too’.26 The fact that 
Maldonado was in close contact with the individuals arrested in Boston in October 2009 
provides additional evidence as to why the ‘Somalia connection’ is considered a serious 
threat. 
 
Conclusion: Since 9/11 the American counterterrorism posture has been extraordinarily 
aggressive, both domestically and globally. Extensive overseas military and intelligence 
gathering actions, the introduction of enhanced investigative powers, a significantly 
improved inter-agency coordination and, in general, a constant high level of vigilance 
have allowed the authorities to keep the country safe from terrorist attacks. While some 
civil libertarians might have a point in questioning some of the tools used to do so, the 
achievement is nevertheless remarkable. At the same time, though, the US seems to be 
lacking a long-term strategy to confront the threat of radicalisation on the domestic front. 
The authorities have in fact been unable to conceive a policy that would pre-emptively 
tackle the issue of radicalisation, preventing young American Muslims from embracing 
extremist ideas in the first place. 
 
Various intelligence and law enforcement agencies have reached out to the academic 
community to better understand the social, political and psychological causes of 
radicalisation. But the limited understanding of the issue, coupled with the overlap of 
jurisdiction between often competing federal, state and local authorities, has prevented 
the implementation of a systematic, nationwide programme to combat radicalisation. 
Solutions are, to be sure, hard to find. Europeans, who experienced the problem of 
radicalisation of segments of their own Muslim communities well before the US, are still 
struggling with the same issue and are only now attempting to put in place coherent anti-
radicalisation programmes, the success of which must still be verified. Equally challenging 
have been the efforts, on both sides of the Atlantic, to find reliable and representative 
organisations within various Muslim communities to be employed as partners in anti-
radicalisation activities. Clearly, more attention and analysis should be devoted to the 
issue. But the awareness that homegrown terrorism of jihadist inspiration does exist in the 
US is a necessary starting point. The events of the fall of 2009 provided, if needed, 
additional evidence to suggest so. 
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26 Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Jeremiah A. George in US v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, US District Court, 
Southern District of Texas, H-07-125M, 13/II/2007. 
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